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NepAl’S protrActed democrAtizAtioN/kANthA
nepAL’S protrActed democrAtizAtion in 
termS oF modeS oF trAnSition  
Since 2005, Nepal has been engaged in a complex political transition. Growing 
differences between the radical Maoists and Nepal’s other political parties have 
stalemated Nepal’s attempt to complete a durable transition to democracy, a 
project intermittently underway since 1950. Yet, significant achievements along 
democratic lines have been made. This article applies the modes of transition 
approach to analyze Nepal’s various political transitions. Modes of transition 
with their emphasis on elite interactions offer a valuable analytical framework 
to examine the Nepali case. Nepal’s transitions confirm as well as question 
many of the assumptions of this body of scholarship. In the first section, the 
paper lays out key theoretical stipulations of the modes of transition; the 
second examines Nepal’s transitions, critically applying these key concepts; 
finally, the third section presents an assessment of problems and prospects 
of consolidating Nepal’s current efforts to achieve a democratic system. 
If explaining regime transition is a complex 
exercise in general, Nepal’s ongoing transition is 
many times more so. Since the mass uprising against 
the ousted King Gyanendra in April 2006, Nepal 
has achieved several political milestones, including 
a Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) with the 
Maoists that ended their decade long insurgency, the 
Constituent Assembly (CA) elections in April 2008 
and the abolition of the 240 year old monarchy in 
May 2008. However, the fate of Nepal’s democratic 
transition still hangs in the balance as the divide 
between the Maoists and Nepal’s other political 
parties continues to widen; since April 2006, 
political stalemate has become the hallmark of 
Nepali politics. 
Nepal’s attempt to craft and secure democracy 
has been unusually protracted since the country’s 
first experience of democracy in the 1950s.  Under 
the Delhi agreement that the then King Tribhuvan 
signed with Nepal’s other political forces, the King 
conceded political sovereignty to a popularly elected 
Constituent Assembly. However, these stipulations 
were shunted aside by King Tribhuvan’s son and 
successor, King Mahendra, who reconsolidated royal 
primacy through the progressive centralization of 
power. The royal coup of December 1960 against 
Nepal’s first ever elected parliament marked the 
grand finale of King Mahendra’s Machiavellian 
maneuvers. For the next thirty years, royal 
despotism prevailed albeit punctuated since 
the late 1970s with further challenges.  In 1990, 
King Birendra was forced to accept a multiparty 
parliamentary system after a massive and violent 
opposition movement to his regime. In April 2006, 
Nepal saw another mass uprising against King 
Birendra’s brother and successor, King Gyanendra, 
who attempted to consolidate his power by openly 
breaching the limitations on royal powers under 
the 1990 constitution.  
How does one explain Nepal’s  difficult  quest 
for democracy and the success and setbacks of 
this enterprise? Encumbered by extreme poverty, 
illiteracy and a long history of despotic rule, is 
Nepal’s political transition likely to produce a 
sustainable democracy? Where is the bastion of 
Nepal’s democratic aspirations: among the elites, 
amonng the changing socio political dynamics 
of its people, or with external forces? With these 
questions I turn to literature on transition from 
authoritarianism for insights and generalizations 
that could help explain Nepal’s political transitions. 
How helpful are the findings of this body of 
prAmod k. kAnthA  Wright state University
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Modes of transition studies are distinctive in their focus 
on elite interactions as instrumental in determining the path 
of success or failure of transitions to produce democratic 
regimes. A Pioneering study of modes of transition from 
authoritarianism by O’Donnell and Schmitter found in the 
interactions of incumbent and opposition elites clues to 
develop a typology of transition, and to make inferences as to 
whether the prospects for the consolidation of democracy is 
impacted by how transition occurs.  Uncertainty of actors and 
their strategies is the hallmark of this approach as the actors 
are “divided and hesitant about their interests and ideals and, 
hence, incapable of coherent collective actions” (O’Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986: 4-6). Scholars of modes of transition have 
stressed “contingency” of outcomes resulting from “collective 
decisions and political interactions” (Lynn, and Schmitter 
1991: 271-274). The critical role of elites has been stressed by 
several other studies. Bermeo asserts that failure of civilian 
elites to “compromise or bargain and abide by the outcome of 
the democratic game “endangers democracy”. Democracies, 
she says, are “recreated piece by piece, institution by institution 
and the creators are usually old enemies” (Bermeo 1992: 273-
81).  Other studies on Latin America and Southern Europe 
have even compared the consequences of elite settlements 
with “social revolution”; lingering mutual suspicions and 
failure to live by democratic rules of the game lead to the 
breakdown of democracy (Burton, Gunther and Higely 1992: 
5; Cohen 1994: 6-7; Huntington 1996: 8). 
Lynn and Schmitter advanced four modes of transition: pact, 
imposition, reform and revolution. The level of accommodation 
between the old and new elite separated one mode from another. 
Pact resulted from compromise; imposition was unilaterally 
carried out by incumbents, reform was orchestrated by mass 
mobilization and compromise without violence. Revolution 
resulted from a complete break with the past and the defeat of 
the incumbent elites (Lynn and Schmitter 1991: 275-76). Later 
Munck and Leff revisited these modes and realized the need 
to look beyond the single dimension of continuity between the 
old and new regime to understand the role of various elites. 
They thus altered the modes of transition approach by adding 
another criterion, the “identity of the primary agents of change.” 
They defined transitions as “uniquely fluid processes defined 
by the identity of regime challengers and their strategies in 
challenging the old regime.” With these modifications, Munck 
and Leff expanded the typology by adding categories that 
allowed greater discrimination of the role of actors in various 
modes of transition. Here is a summary of their modes and 
their specifications (1997: 344-46): 
1. Reforms from below are driven by pressure from the 
outside by broad opposition movements for reform; 
however, the incumbent elites still remain powerful 
enough to define the parameters of participation. This 
mode leads to “restricted democracy.” 
2. Reforms through transaction is a “more complicated and 
protracted” process. Although it heralds less restricted 
democracy, the old elite retain lingering power, which 
literature to understand the Nepali case? 
This paper fills a critical void in the literature on the 
democratization process. South Asia has been largely  ignored 
by scholarship on democratic transitions. One reason for such 
neglect could be India’s widely hailed status as the world’s 
largest and one of more successful democracies. India’s success 
in that sense has overshadowed the continuing struggle by 
millions of people in other countries of this region to achieve 
democratic governance. This study, I hope, will reveal some 
patterns that will contribute also to a wider understanding of 
democratization processes. 
The first part of this paper provides a brief overview of 
the procedural  approach to study democratization,  and lays 
down the basic premises of modes of transition to democracy. 
In the second part, the paper applies the central findings of 
the modes of transition approach to examine Nepal’s long 
drawn out transition to democracy. The third part of the 
paper critically examines the problems with and prospects 
for the consolidation of a democratic regime in Nepal. 
modeS oF trAnSition And nepAl’S 
politicAl trAnSFormAtion 
Literature on the third wave of democratization shows 
broad agreement on defining democracy in procedural 
terms; this approach is also referred to as democratization 
on an “Installment Plan” (Diamond, Linz & Lipset 1995:3). 
Nepal’s democratization effort is only conceivable in terms 
of what Lynn and Schmitter calls “rejection of the search for 
prerequisites” and shifting the focus of analysis to “strategic 
choices, shifting alliances, emergent processes and sequential 
patterns” in regime changes (Lynn and Schmitter 1991: 
270). Democracy under this approach is defined in terms 
of minimal procedural conditions rather than substantive 
outcomes resembling developed democracies. According to 
Dahl, constitutionally vested authority in elected officials, 
frequent and fair elections, adult franchise, the right to 
run for office, the right to free expression, and the right to 
seek alternative sources of information, organizations and 
associations are the key conditions of procedural democracy 
(1982: 10-11). Others have included secret balloting, 
partisan competition, and executive accountability to the list 
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 8). Since the late 1980s, the 
ability of the opposition to replace the ruling forces has been 
seen as a key aspect of the dynamics between and within both 
the incumbent and opposition parties. Diamond calls this the 
“litmus test of democracy” (Diamond 1996: 25).  
If democracy can be understood in terms of procedures, 
the role of elites, (both traditional and reformist), emerges as 
the key factor in all phases of democratization. Diamond’s 
remarks here about the centrality of elites are typical. 
He says, “Democratic change is produced not by abstract 
historical and structural forces but by individuals and groups 
choosing, innovating, and taking risks.” He calls democracy 
a “continuum or a process rather than a system that is simply 
either present or absent” (Diamond 1999: xi-xii). 
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they use to impose rules that are not “optimal for 
democratization.” It also leaves the antiauthoritarian 
coalition in disarray. Executive and legislative bodies 
are prone to clash in this mode; both governability 
and democratic consolidation become problematic. 
3. Reforms through extrication lead to “unrestricted 
democracy.” The opposition controls this mode of 
transition by defeating the old elites. Yet, old elites 
due to their reduced but continuing power and 
influence (withhold) “lingering power” allowing for a 
certain degree of continuity with the old regime.  This 
modality is considered favorable to a steady progress 
toward democratization. 
4. Reforms though rupture process is a complete 
turnaround, the “most unproblematic type of 
transition.” Overtaken by the opposition, the process 
leads to unrestricted elections. Under this mode, the 
transition is fast and easy but consolidation is not. The 
elements of antiauthoritarian coalition disintegrate as 
a result of electoral competition. Lacking agreement 
on resolution of constitutional issues, consolidation is 
eluded by stalemates and standoffs.  
5. Reforms through revolution from above are a preemptive 
set of reforms initiated by the reform minded ruling 
elite; the process is controlled and creates division 
and lack of trust among the opposition leaders and 
groups.  
Bold claims were made about the path dependency of 
regimes following these modes of transitions.  Lynn and 
Schmitter called “transition from above” or pacts, where 
the traditional rulers “retain at least part of their power,” as 
the most likely to lead to some form of political democracy. 
They unequivocally asserted that revolutions were least 
likely to lead to “patterns of fair competition, unrestricted 
contestation, tolerance for rotation in power and free 
associability (Lynn and Schmitter 1991: 280-281). 
Modes of transition have since drawn critical reviews. 
Studies of East European transitions have found various 
assumptions of the modes of transition approach 
questionable. For example, McFaul and Bunce find some 
of the key observations from earlier studies of transitions 
lacking relevance in post-communist transitions. Instead 
of continuity with the old regime, the East European cases, 
Bunce points out, underline “severing ties” with the old as 
more important in building democratic regimes. In sharp 
contrast to the assertion of modes of transition approach, 
she also found mass mobilization as “proximate and positive 
influence” (Bunce 2003: 174-178). McFaul has concluded 
that democracy emerged in countries where democrats, 
not the traditional elites, had the overwhelming power 
and failed where traditional dictatorial elites had decisive 
power. He found that equal balance of power resulted 
in “unconsolidated, unstable partial democracies and 
autocracies” as the protagonists got caught in “protracted 
confrontation” (McFaul 2002: 213-214).” In a later work, 
McFaul and Stoner Weiss reaffirm that not “all change is 
evolutionarily.” They find that “many of the most important 
changes in regime development and economy are rapid and 
abrupt” (McFaul and Weiss 2004: 8-9). 
The concepts of transition, liberalization and consolidation 
are always tied to any discussion of the democratization 
process. For O’Donnell and Schmitter “attempts by an 
authoritarian regime to modify their rules so as to provide 
“more secure guarantees for the rights of individuals 
and groups” typically mark the beginning of transition. 
O’Donnell and Schmitter also identify uncertainty and 
shifting coalitions as essential features of transition process 
(1986:4-6). Likewise, for Bunce, transition to democracy 
comes to an end with the “formation of the first popularly 
elected government” (2003: 179). Shain and Linz define 
transition in democratic regime change as “an undefined 
period between the launching of the process of dissolution 
of an authoritarian regime and the installation of some form 
of democracy, or the return to some form of authoritarian 
rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative at the 
end” (Shain and Linz 1995: 7).  Fox, on the basis of his recent 
studies of post communist Europe, concludes that “the 
conventional notion of political democratization as a single 
regime transition should be recast as a set of transitions along 
the various key dimensions of democracy.”  He points to the 
need to study the relationship of “electoral competition” 
to factors like “civilian control over the military, effective 
universal suffrage, an end to vote fraud, or ending impunity 
for state sanctioned violence” (Fox 1994: 184).
As to when transition is to be considered complete, Linz 
and Stepan consider it complete when “sufficient agreement 
has been reached about political procedures to produce an 
elected government, when a government comes to power 
that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when 
this government de facto has the authority to generate new 
policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial 
power generated by the new democracy does not have to share 
power with other bodies de jure” (1997: 3). These conditions 
are highly demanding and their status is often difficult to 
determine in view of complex interactions between various 
centers of power in new emerging democracies. Marybeth 
Peterson Ulrich addresses some of these conceptual problems 
in her study Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases 
of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces as she underlines the 
need to see democratization as a continuum. She identifies the 
need to observe several dimensions including “socialization 
of the military along democratic lines” and, attainment of 
civilian supremacy, which she concludes depends on “a sense 
of mutual confidence between military and civilian leaders” 
(1999: 17).   
The concepts of liberalization and democratization also 
relate to the transition process and its aftermath. O’Donnell 
and Schmitter point out that the implementation of the 
measures to liberalize the regime produces “a multiplier 
effect” and prompts greater number of people to exercise new 
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reflected deep cleavages in the ranks of the traditional elites. 
Under the Delhi agreement, negotiated between the three 
parties—the King, the Ranas and the Nepali Congress—
under Indian mediation, the King accepted a democratic 
system to be established by an elected Constituent Assembly 
(CA).  
Analysis of Nepal’s first transition process reveals, as 
pointed out earlier, both confirmation as well as anomalies 
of the modes of transition approach. The category that fits 
Delhi agreement most is what Munck and Leff calls reform 
through transaction. Bridging the old and the new was central 
to the Delhi Accord. The government that immediately 
followed the agreement was still led by the Ranas though it 
shared power with the representatives of Nepali Congress. 
This government was supposed to be an interim government 
whose main responsibility was to facilitate the CA elections. 
The role of elites was crucial as the agreement was worked 
out between the King, the Ranas and Nepali Congress.  Soon 
after the Delhi agreement it became evident that the King 
and his traditional supporters were the primary agents of this 
protracted transition; they defined the rules of the game and 
undermined the consolidation of democracy. 
How about path dependency? Did the Delhi agreement 
support the conclusion of the modes of transition approach 
that elite interactions determine the path of the subsequent 
regime and the level of its success or failure in establishing 
democracy? The answer is not resoundingly affirmative. 
Instead of living by the pact, traditional elites led by the 
King were bent on violating it. Hence, the pact alone fails to 
offer a reliable road map for its implementation. The Delhi 
agreement seemed to have created an anomalous situation by 
tipping the agreement in favor of Nepal’s nascent democratic 
forces under Indian influence, making the traditional 
elites resent the agreement as an imposition by India. This 
factor underlines the critical role of external actors in the 
geopolitically vulnerable states, an element that needs greater 
recognition and analysis, as it is largely ignored, especially in 
the early transition studies. 
The agreement also made Nepal’s democratic leaders 
vulnerable to the allegation of promoting India’s excessive 
influence in Nepal, a factor that was used quite successfully 
to marginalize reformist elites, especially those of the Nepali 
Congress. The Delhi agreement and its corollary Peace 
and Friendship Treaty between India and Nepal negatively 
colored Nepal’s self image, which turned into a powerful 
factor in shaping future political course. Overwhelming 
Indian influence reflected in the Delhi agreement as well as 
in the Indian role in subsequent internal political dealings 
in Nepal left many Nepalese convinced that India did not 
take Nepal’s independence seriously. The period 1950-55 
came to be characterized as an era of “special relations” with 
India because of excessive Indian meddling in all aspects of 
Nepali politics and administration. Opposition to India’s big 
brotherly role in Nepali affairs became the rallying cry for 
Nepal’s new nationalism, a line promoted by King Mahendra. 
freedoms and to challenge the limits of liberalizing regimes 
(1986: 7). Liberalization, according to Huntington, “is the 
partial opening of an authoritarian system short of choosing 
governmental leaders through freely competitive elections” 
(Huntington 1991: 9).  Democratization, on the other hand, 
requires “open contestation over the right to win control 
of government, and this in turn requires free competitive 
elections, the results of which determine who governs” (Linz 
and Stepan 1997: 3-8). 
Consolidation of democracy is the optimum goal of all 
democratic transitions. Yet, scholarship is hardly precise in 
defining a consolidated democracy. To quote Bunce again, 
“consolidation of democracy refers to the degree to which the 
key elements of a democratic order are in place, and whether 
those elements function to promote effective, inclusive, 
and accountable governance”; she defines sustainability 
of democracy in terms of  the continuation of democratic 
rule  (Bunce 2003: 179). Linz and Stepan see consolidated 
democracy as “a political situation in which, in a phrase, 
democracy has become “the only game in town” (1997: 3). 
Burton, Gunther and Higley find “dis-unified elites” unable 
to agree on even the “basic rules of political conduct” most 
inimical to the democratic consolidation process (1992: 
3-12). Consolidated democracy has also been defined in 
more technical way in terms of the “two-turnover test.”  A 
democracy passes this test if the party or group that came 
to power in the initial election or founding election at the 
time of transition (to democracy) loses a subsequent election 
and hands over the reins of power to the new winners, and if 
these new election winners then peacefully turn over power 
to the winners of a later elections (Lijphart 1999: 6-7). For 
Diamond, consolidated democracy will require a “shift in 
political culture” (1999: 65).  
modeS oF trAnSition in nepAl’S cASe 
How does the preceding literature review help in analyzing 
Nepal’s efforts to democratize?  Is Nepal’s experience akin to 
the transition in Eastern Europe or is it illuminated better with 
the modes of transition approach rooted in the experience of 
Southern Europe and Latin America? Alternatively, does the 
Nepali case show the relevance of the major findings of both 
sets of studies? I have divided Nepal’s journey to democracy 
into four phases of transitions; 1950-1959; 1979-1981; 1990-
91 and 2005-present. I apply retrospectively, the findings of 
modes of transition in terms of the categories developed by 
Munck and Leff to Nepal’s first transition.  
nepal’s First transition 1950-1959: reform through 
transaction
Nepal’s first breakthrough in democratic rule occurred 
in 1950-51 with the flight of then King Tribhuvan to India 
in defiance of the Ranas who had ruled Nepal since 1846. 
During this period, the Ranas were the defacto rulers 
rendering the the King a virtual prisoner in the palace (Joshi 
and Rose 1966: 26). The King’s defection from the Ranas 
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Interestingly, both King Tribhuvan and the Nepali Congress 
leader B. P. Koirala were rumored to have proposed that 
Nepal be integrated into India. Had it not been for Nehru’s 
opposition, this rumor claims, nationalist Indian leaders 
like Sardar Patel and the Jana Sangh1 leader K. R. Malakani 
would have annexed Nepal (BBC Nepali Service, 2007). 
Nepal’s communist groups denounced the agreement as a 
‘betrayal of their revolution’ (Thapa 2004: 23). 
The King used the uncertainty of actors and their strategies 
to his advantage. Without much difficulty, the monarch was 
able to bypass the provision of popular election to the CA 
by having the political leaders agree to his royal draft of a 
constitution. The king co-opted opponents of the Nepali 
Congress party as his allies in his endeavor (Baral 1977: 28-
30; Uprety 1993: 20). By the time Nepal’s first parliamentary 
elections were held in 1959, the ground rules were all written 
at the behest of the King.  These elections lacked “rules that 
are specifically apriori, explicit, potentially familiar to all 
participants and subject to change only according to rules.” 
This left the political parties at the mercy of the King. Hence, 
Przeworski’s “alienation of control of all actors over outcomes 
of conflicts,” which he calls “the essence of democracy” was 
lacking in Nepal’s first parliamentary elections (1988: 56-
58). 
The 1959 election results further exacerbated elite 
disunity in Nepal. The Nepali Congress’s two thirds majority 
in the 1959 elections became its own undoing as it alienated 
the other political parties and drove them into the royal camp. 
Bermeo’s observation that “democracies usually break down 
with the active or passive support of a substantial sector of 
the civilian political elite” was so true of the Nepali context 
(Bermeo 1992: 276). 
The King also benefitted from the fast changing 
geopolitical situation culminating in the 1962 Sino-Indian 
war. India’s new security imperatives trumped the fate of 
Nepal’s democracy as a priority. This allowed the King to 
assert his independence from India and further expand the 
diplomatic contacts that he had started building. His China 
visit in late 1960 had secured a Chinese commitment to 
build a 104-kilometer long highway connecting Kathmandu 
with Tibet. In 1962, the Chinese foreign minister Chen Yi 
warned that in the event of any foreign attack against Nepal, 
China would side with the Nepali people. It was interpreted 
as a veiled threat to India. The King also befriended India’s 
arch enemy Pakistan; Pakistani military leader Ayub Khan 
supported the royal takeover. This shift in India’s policy 
toward the regime in Nepal came as an early precursor of 
what Schmitter and Brouwer found in another context, that 
Democracy Promotion and Protection (DPP) has been  “a 
weapon in the foreign policy arsenal” and DPP gets trumped 
by “more pressing foreign policy objectives” (Schmitter & 
Brouwer 1999: 4). 
Nepal’s case thus raises an important point, that in order 
1. The Jana Sangh became the BJP in 1980).
to be sustained, the democratic blueprint must reflect the 
reality of the relative strength of traditional and reformist 
elites. Nepal’s first revolution, as Joshi and Rose point out, 
was “relatively a very brief episode, but its consequences 
were epoch-making for contemporary Nepal “(Joshi and 
Rose 1966: 78).” India’s role in Nepali politics echoes 
Migdal’s observation that the “role and effectiveness of the 
state domestically is highly interdependent with its place in 
the world of states (1988: 21). 
nepal’s Second transition 1979-1981: reform from 
below
Nepal’s second transition started amidst growing 
turbulence for the new King Birendra, who ascended to 
the throne in 1972 upon the death of his father. King 
Mahendra’s centralized system alienated the opposition as 
well as supporters of the regime. Internal squabbling among 
the regime leaders over the spoils of power intensified 
(Baral 1983: 22). Opposition groups became bolder. 
In 1976, the Nepali Congress leaders Bisheshor Prasad 
Koirala (B. P.) and Ganesh Man Singh returned from their 
exile in India and called for power sharing with the King 
(Baral 1983: 29). Koirala warned that if democratic forces 
in Nepal remained in a continuing state of weakness, the 
influence of pro-Chinese Communists in Nepal would soon 
become overwhelming. The opposition to the regime also 
grew as education and political awareness raised the level 
of discontent and expanded avenues for mobilization and 
expression of political discontent. This period consisted of 
what Bermeo calls the “critical moment between the crisis of 
the old order and the consolidation of the new one” (Bermeo 
1992: 273). 
King Birendra’s regime confronted a “perceptible rise in 
acts of both governmental and popular violence accompanied 
by waves of unrest among students and peasants.” In June 
1973, a Royal Nepal Airlines plane was hijacked by some 
Nepali Congress activists. In September 1974, four men 
convicted of possession of hand grenades were executed. 
Later that year, a secretariat building burnt down in 
Kathmandu amidst suspicion of opposition involvement 
(Shah 1990: 10-12). The opposition to the regime culminated 
in 1978-79 with widespread protests against the royal 
regime on college campuses and streets. In May 1979, amidst 
increasing incidents of confrontation between the protestors 
and security forces, the King announced his intention to 
hold a national referendum subjecting the prevailing system 
of restricted, partyless democracy to popular vote, allowing 
people to opt if they chose for an alternative multiparty 
system. By this move, the King launched Nepali’s second 
transition. 
Nepal’s second transition fits into Munck and Leff ’s first 
category reform from below. Unlike the first transition marked 
by predominant external influence and marginal role of 
opposition forces, “pressure from outside” was pronounced 
during this period although the incumbent elites still 
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elected to parliament (Shramjivi 1992: 43-47). The unraveling 
of the royal regime had started with the national referendum 
and had continued in its aftermath. 
The role of external factors —especially that of India—was 
less pronounced in Nepal’s second transition, a significant 
departure from the first one. However, one finds India’s role 
increasing as the regime moved towards the beginning of 
Nepal’s third transition. King’s Birendra’s troubled relations 
with India became well known. By mid 1970s, India had 
concluded that its policy of restraining the Nepalese opposition 
from acting against the royal regime in Nepal had produced 
few dividends. In 1975, King Birendra declared Nepal a zone 
of peace; India saw it as an anti-Indian posture of the regime. 
The royal regime also imported arms from China using the 
highway link to Tibet, further alienating India. In 1989, 
India refused to renew the transit treaty and closed 13 of the 
16 entry points on which Nepal relied for its imports and 
exports. The impact of this move was decisive. People had to 
stand in line for hours to get their daily necessities like salt, 
kerosene etc. India also launched a propaganda drive on its 
radio and television against the royal regime in Nepal.  
nepal’s third transition 1990-1991: reform through 
extrication
At the beginning of 1990, fundamental shifts occurred in 
both the internal and external factors affecting the state. In 
January, the Nepali Congress held its convention and issued 
the final call for a peaceful movement for the restoration of 
democracy. One of India’s most prominent leaders (and later 
Prime Minister), Chandrasekhar, delivered a fiery speech 
that worked as “a great source of inspiration” for the Nepali 
Congress leaders (Uprety 1993: 127-130).  An alliance of 
left parties, the United Left Alliance, immediately joined 
the Congress’s call to form a Movement for Restoration 
of Democracy (MRD). This was the first time ever that the 
Nepali Congress had joined hands with the left parties, 
seven of whom had come together to form a united front. 
The movement captured the aspirations and support of the 
new and growing middle class of doctors, lawyers, teachers, 
journalists, trade union leaders and industrialists. Even 
government employees were sympathetic to the movement 
(Sanwal 1993: 202-203). Thus, the identity and strategies of 
the political parties had undergone a marked shift from the 
first period of transition. Building upon their collaboration 
during the national referendum, Nepal’s political parties 
were once again ready to work with each other for securing 
democratic reforms.  
The movement soon gathered unprecedented momentum 
and support. On April 6, a massive demonstration took 
place in Kathmandu and the crowd later started marching 
toward the nearby palace resulting in a confrontation with 
security forces causing scores of deaths. Fatalities were also 
reported from other parts of the country. On April 19, the 
King dismantled the three decade old no-party system and 
appointed an 11-member interim government consisting 
retained sufficient leverage to lead the transition process and 
hence restrict full democracy. The role of the mass and civil 
society groups marked by organizations of students, labor 
unions, professional groups such as lawyers associations, 
bureaucracy became increasingly more important in Nepal’s 
struggle to leave behind the grip of authoritarian rule. 
This transition fundamentally redefined the contours of 
Nepali politics. For the first time since the 1950s, media in Nepal 
enjoyed unrestricted freedom following the announcement 
of the national referendum; this freedom largely continued 
even after the no-party system favored by the King secured a 
narrow but controversial victory. King Birendra announced 
a series of constitutional amendments prior to the holding of 
the referendum in May 1980; the amendments included direct 
elections for national assembly members, appointment of the 
Prime Minster on the recommendation of the legislature, 
and collective responsibility of the cabinet to the legislature. 
These amendments, in turn, created room for progressive 
denudation of royal power and augmented internal tension 
by including all the elements of a parliamentary democracy 
without its most critical part, the political parties (Shah 1990: 
19-20). 
Like in the case of the first transition, Nepal’s second 
transition also proved protracted,  making it imprudent to 
limit the period of transition to just the holding of the national 
referendum and national elections in 1981. The modes of 
transition approach does offer important insights into the 
encumbrances that the reformed regime suffered from. The 
two concrete outcomes of this transition, the disputed verdict 
and constitutional amendments, exacerbated the regime’s lack 
of legitimacy, alienating its supporters as well as opponents. 
Although the regime won the referendum by securing  55 
percent of the votes in favor of the no party system favored by 
the king, political parties continued to function albeit without 
legal recognition; the press continued relatively unrestrained. 
Growing signs of cooperation appeared during this period 
between political parties. Along with the Congress Party, 
influential communist groups supported multi-party system, 
in sharp departure from their earlier policy of pursuing 
armed revolution.  In fact, it was an early indication of the 
inclination of some of the communist groups to play by the 
rules of a democratic political system. 
In the aftermath of the referendum, two general elections 
were held in 1981 and 1986. These elections drew participation 
of candidates with clear affiliation to political parties, even 
though technically parties remained banned. In the 1981 
election, a faction of the Nepali Congress won 4 seats. A 
communist faction also participated but failed to win any seat 
(Shah 1982: 206-207). All the influential communist groups 
boycotted the elections (Shrestha 1990: 19-31). The rank 
and file members of Nepali Congress favored participation 
as a means to stay in touch with the people and strengthen 
the party’s grassroots support (Baral 1983: 5). In the 1986 
elections, the Nepali Congress participated at the local level. 
Several prominent members of the left affiliated parties were 
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of the members of protesting parties (Economist April 21, 
1990: 36). The formation of the interim government marked 
the official beginning of Nepal’s third and by far the most 
decisive transition process. With the formation of the interim 
government, Nepal quickly settled a question that Shain 
and Linz call a “central one” in regime transition: “who 
governs between the start of a democratic transition and the 
assumption of power by a freely elected government” (Shain 
and Linz 1995: 4). This interim government led the country 
through the drafting of the 1990 constitution and the holding 
of the founding elections in 1991. 
How do we characterize Nepal’s third transition? The 
modality of reform through extrication does capture major 
trends. Each of the major elements of the second transition 
(the national referendum and constitutional reforms allowing 
direct elections to the National Assembly) had laid the ground 
for the King’s decision to accept a multiparty system and 
eventually the mode of extrication. Taking place against the 
backdrop of popular protests, these reforms were not simply 
royal giveaways but also aimed to secure the King’s status 
as constitutional monarch. Each of these steps did mark a 
substantial break from the past practices; at each juncture the 
incumbent elites (hard liners) felt defeated and King Birendra 
earned a solid reputation as a reformist King. 
The King yielded to the opposition demand for an 
unrestricted democracy and the shift of sovereign power 
from the king to the people. The role of the masses in this 
transition was more critical than ever before. Dozens of 
people were reported killed by the security forces before the 
King surrendered his power. This unrest against the royal 
regime has since come to be known as Nepal’s First People’s 
Movement. However, despite these sweeping changes the 
King retained some important lingering power that continued 
to influence the dynamics of the subsequent regime. This 
made Nepal’s third transition an example of reform through 
extrication, and not a complete rupture from the old regime. 
Unlike the earlier two transitions, democratic reforms 
were sweeping and swift. A new constitution was adopted 
in November 1990 by the cabinet. The constitution adopted 
a multiparty parliamentary system, guaranteed popular 
sovereignty and fundamental rights, and included the 
independence of the judiciary equipped with the power of 
judicial review. As indicated earlier, the constitution did 
leave some loopholes that supported lingering powers for 
the king. The king remained the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Royal Nepalese Army, an institution with unwavering 
loyalty to the king. The king also had the power to declare 
national emergencies. The constitution was silent on whether 
the king needed to consult the government before using the 
emergency powers, although it did provide that the House 
of Representatives had to approve his exercise of that power 
within three months of his doing so (Parajulee 2000: 105-
108). Nepal’s third transition not only clearly ended with 
the general elections in 1991 but  also met the stipulations 
of consolidation. The founding general elections of 1991 
were followed by two other rounds of national elections in 
1994 and 1999. The elections were fiercely competitive; the 
Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal-United 
Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML), emerged as the two leading 
contenders.  The latter two elections also saw alternation of 
power from the incumbent to the opposition. Hence, Nepal 
passed both competitive elections and turnover tests. 
How far can the regime emerging from the third transition 
and its subsequent patterns of operation, the success and 
failure, be explained in terms of the factors and interactions 
that characterized Nepal’s third transition? Nepal’s third 
transition did  confirm various stipulations of reform through 
extrication. The opposition elites had won a decisive victory 
over the royal regime and were the primary force behind the 
transition. Also, for the first time, the Nepali political parties 
had entered into an interim government of national unity 
to govern and to facilitate the writing of the constitution, 
a pattern that continues even under the current ongoing 
transition. The rules of the game agreed upon by the elites 
provided stability to the system and allowed the holding of 
three successive elections and alternation of power. 
Can the mode of transition explain the subsequent 
reversal of the democratic regime that came into being in 
1991? The answer here is mixed.  Ambiguities left in the 1990 
constitution about the exercise of the emergency powers of the 
king played a disruptive role. The constitution left the king as 
the commander in chief of the military even though the king 
was mandated to follow the government’s recommendation 
on military matters. These formal provisions shifting the 
control of the military to the civilian arena lacked teeth in 
view of the failure of civilian leaders to assert their control 
over a military that throughout history remained steadfastly 
loyal to the palace. A well connected security sector analyst 
in Kathmandu told me in December 2007 that leaving the 
command and control of the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) in the 
palace was a blunder on the part of civilian leaders.  
Nepal’s new democracy soon encountered severe 
challenges and their roots can be traced to the mode of third 
transition and the nature of involvement of various parties 
in that process. The inter-party and intra-party scramble 
for power undermined the stability of the new regime. 
Between December 1994 and January 1999, Nepal had six 
new governments and five different individuals as Prime 
Ministers. Reports of widespread corruption lowered public 
trust in the democratic leaders. Elite disunity thus became a 
critical element in the weakening of the democratic regime. 
The most corrosive factor that undermined the regime 
emerging from Nepal’s third transition was the impact 
of the radical left. In February 1996, a faction of Nepali 
communists (known as the “Maoists”) declared insurgency 
against Nepal’s new democracy. Another crucial factor but 
coming from outside the 1990-91 transition, was the palace 
massacre in June 2001, in which King Birendra along with all 
the members of his immediate family lost their lives. 
King Gyanendra, who succeeded his brother after the 
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The twelve-point agreement marked the beginning of the end 
of monarchy. The King had no role in this new partnership 
between Nepal’s mainstream political parties and the 
Maoists. 
The Delhi understanding became the basis of the most 
sweeping regime transformation marking a complete break 
from the past. The end of the royal regime came sooner than 
anyone had expected. The SPA parties, with the support of 
the Maoists, started the April movement as a strike call in 
the Kathmandu valley from April 6-9, 2006. The opposition 
campaign continued till April 25 when the king restored 
the House of Representatives dissolved since May 2002 
and surrendered the executive powers to the SPA leaders. 
Nepal’s newly empowered leaders completely sidelined the 
King through a series of declarations that changed the name 
of the Royal Nepal Army to Nepal Army and His Majesty’s 
government to Nepal Government. Laws were also passed to 
impose taxes on the king and limit his compensation. On 
May 29, 2008  Nepal became the newest republican state by 
abolishing the monarchy. 
Uncertainty has defined the position of internal as well as 
external actors. Internally, the King’s moves to reconsolidate 
his power were perhaps guided by certain hopes of success. 
This could have been based on the evident lack of  oppositional 
unity against the king. The Nepali Congress and Nepal’s 
parliamentary communist parties remained divided until 
close to November 2005 over their understanding of the role 
of the monarchy, with the former supporting a constitutional 
monarchy and the latter favoring a republic. Their repeated 
effort to persuade foreign powers to exert greater pressure on 
the King to accommodate them had failed. Their overtures to 
the Maoists for ending insurgency and forging common front 
had either been dismissed or elicited an uncertain response. 
The King expected to win public support through various 
measures to provide greater security and transparency in 
government. The King also showed overconfidence in the 
ability of his security forces to defeat or contain the Maoist 
insurgency.
The international response to the King’s usurpation of 
power before his February 2005 coup was also muted. India 
continued to insist on its twin pillar policy of supporting 
constitutional monarchy and democracy in Nepal adopted since 
the 1990. However¸  King Gyanendra’s refusal to accommodate 
the democratic leaders and his regime’s inability to make any 
headway in fighting the insurgency opened a schism in India’s 
policy. India’s security establishment along with the centrist 
and right wing forces wanted to continue fighting the Maoists 
by beefing up the Nepali army. The Indian Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh favored this line by seeking a compromise 
between the King and the political parties to strengthen the 
fight against the Maoists but the King was not receptive. King 
Gyanendra further alienated India by reaching out to China 
for arms and by insisting at the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in November 2005 
on giving China either regular membership or observer status 
palace massacre, revived the rivalry between the palace and 
democratic forces.  As the new King started outmaneuvering 
political leaders, the loyalty of the military to the king and 
the raging Maoist insurgency became his chief weapons 
to marginalize the political parties. In November 2001, 
the beleaguered Nepali Congress government led by Sher 
Bahadur Deuba agreed to declare a national emergency 
after it failed to negotiate a peace deal with the Maoists, and 
after Nepal’s military leaders refused to fight the insurgency 
without such a declaration. When emergency was declared, it 
sharply divided Nepal’s political parties and emboldened the 
new King to consolidate his power. In October 2002, King 
Gyanendra dismissed the Prime Minister.  Between October 
2002 and February 2005, the King hired and fired Prime 
Ministers at will.  In February 2005, he took direct control 
of government; his move was interpreted as another coup 
against democratic government, a replay of what his father 
had done in December 1960. 
the Fourth transition 2005- present: reforms 
though rupture
The last and ongoing transition started amidst growing 
tension between King Gyanendra and Nepal’s parliamentary 
parties leading to reform through rupture. Conflict between 
elites is the central factor explaining the rupture. The 
King’s moves clearly violated the basic rules of Nepal’s third 
transition; the 1990 constitution had clearly made the King 
a constitutional monarch despite certain ambiguities in his 
powers. The rupture of Nepal’s democratic continuity also 
showed both the weakness and strength of Nepal’s political 
parties. The political parties remained highly divided in their 
response to the king until November 2005 when a historic 
agreement was reached to launch a joint struggle against the 
King’s move. The role of external actors, especially India and 
United States, was also ambiguous.  Alarmed by the growing 
power of the Maoist insurgency, external powers had paid 
little attention to the demands of political parties until they 
realized that the King’s despotic regime had no chance of 
defeating the insurgency either. 
What forced the King to relinquish his power? The 
unity of oppositional leaders emerges as the most important 
factor. Nepal’s opposition parties, pushed around by an 
uncompromising King, reached out to the Maoists. In 
November 2005 Nepal’s Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the 
insurgent Maoists, with the blessing of India, reached a twelve-
point letter of understanding in New Delhi. The Maoists 
pledged to join the other political parties in their campaign 
to restore Nepal’s stalled democratic process. In return, the 
SPA leaders accepted the long-standing Maoist demand for 
Constituent Assembly elections. The understanding also 
included provisions for including the Maoists in the interim 
government and a commitment on the part of the Maoists to 
respect the democratic process and return the properties they 
had illegally seized. This was the first commitment on the 
part of the Nepali Maoists to join the democratic mainstream. 
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in the SAARC; New Delhi saw this as an attempt by Nepal 
and Pakistan to undercut India’s regional role in the region 
(Srivastava 2005). 
The massive popular uprising against the King in the 
Nepali capital and other parts of the country  was largely 
unanticipated. The role of the masses ,therefore, became 
the decisive element in this transition although the initial 
momentum was provided by the elite compromise reached 
through the Delhi understanding. For the first time, 
the protestors included a large number of government 
bureaucrats. Neither India nor the United States seemed to 
have accurately gauged the fast developing situation in Nepal. 
The peace process that India had helped start in November 
2005 was moving well beyond New Delhi’s ability to manage. 
India was not alone in misreading the situation; the American 
Ambassador, James. F. Moriarty, had mistakenly concluded 
that the King could survive by acting promptly to compromise 
with the opposition (CNN April 21, 2006). 
proSpectS For conSolidAtion And 
conclUSionS  
As envisaged by reform through rupture, the nature of 
the changes that have taken place in Nepal is sweeping. The 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the 
SPA and the Maoists in November 2006 was a land mark in 
terms of laying a path for mainstreaming the Maoists. The CPA 
led to the involvement of the United Nations in monitoring 
the Maoists’ weapons and combatants. The successful CA 
elections in April 2008 and the declaration of the republic in 
May 2008 are two other major achievements of the post-April 
2006 period.  The elimination of the monarchy from the basic 
political dynamics of Nepal has removed a principal hurdle 
in Nepal’s democratization process. Nepal’s latest transition 
has also broadened participation from different ethnic 
and minority groups, including women and traditionally 
marginalized Madhesi, Dalits and indigenous groups, thereby 
significantly increasing the number of stakeholders in the 
political process. 
Nepal’s electoral arena, as evidenced by the CA election 
results, has become even more competitive. While the 
Maoists emerged as the largest party in the CA with 220 
seats, it could only form a coalition with the support of other 
parties. Although the electoral performance of the hitherto 
two leading parties of the Seven Party Alliance, the Nepali 
Congress and the CPN-UML, was dismal, they still command 
considerable political leverage as the second and third largest 
parties. The Tarai based parties, the Madhesi People’s Rights 
Forum (MPRF) and the Tarai Madhesh Loktantrik Party 
(TMLP), emerged as the fourth and fifth largest parties in the 
CA. Unlike the Maoist sweep of the hilly regions, the Tarai 
parties presented an effective challenge to the Maoists as well 
as to other parties in the Tarai.  
As envisaged by the rupture mode of transition, the 
progress of Nepal’s transition has been hampered by various 
factors, leaving the prospects for consolidation of democracy 
highly uncertain. The CA elections have made the SPA parties 
and the Maoists preoccupied with their electoral prospects. 
Since the CA elections, cooperation between the major 
political parties, especially between the Maoists and others, 
has been difficult, leading to stalemate, confrontation and 
political instability. 
In Nepal’s case, one finds validity of both earlier and later 
experiences of transition from authoritarian rule. Nepal’s 
fourth transition also involved incorporating the insurgent 
Maoists, who continue to espouse a radical ideology and 
are backed by organized cadres and militia. O’Donnell and 
Schmitter’s clear determination of the unlikely consolidation 
of democracy in situations where the radical political forces 
hold sway does appear relevant to explaining the divide 
between the Maoists and other political forces. Repeated 
assertion by the Maoist leaders of their ultimate objective 
of capturing the state and completing their revolution has 
deepened the political divide. 
Moreover, the Maoist demand for the integration into 
the Nepal Army of thousands of their combatants currently 
housed in cantonments has caused serious rift between the 
Maoists and the military, which finds support for its position 
from  most of the non-Maoist political parties. The Nepali 
army as well as Nepal’s other political parties see the Moaist 
demand  as a ploy to undermine the army and undermine 
the Nepali state with a view to eventually stage a Maoist 
takeover. 
The Maoists’ role in Nepal’s latest transition has also been 
very transformative. This contradicts earlier assertions in the 
modes of transition literature that radical forces are always 
counterproductive as far as the emergence of a democratic 
regime is concerned. It is undeniable that the Maoists of 
Nepal played a critical role in the success of the April 2006 
movement. The Maoists also launched an unequivocal 
campaign for the abolition of monarchy and the declaration 
of a republic along with their persistent demand for CA 
elections. Nepal’s other political parties followed the Maoists 
lead on these critical issues. 
The Maoists are not only aware of their instrumental role 
in Nepal’s political transformation but are also committed to 
outsmarting the other political parties. Distrust between the 
Maoists and other parties have grown wider as the Maoists 
have violated the terms of the peace accord and sought power 
by any means possible including violence and extortion. The 
Maoists’ winning of the largest number of seats in the CA 
elections further boosted their confidence to pursue a radical 
agenda. 
The Maoists, in their quest to advance their interests, 
have disregarded past agreements and understandings.  This 
has undermined their ability to win over and hold on to 
partners.  This allowed the Nepali Congress-led coalition to 
stay in power till August 2008, four months after the April 
CA elections.  The Maoists’ policy of brinkmanship also 
led to their ouster from power in May 2009. The Maoists 
resigned over their failed attempt to sack the Chief of Army 
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Staff, Rukumgat Katuwal; the move was opposed  by most of 
Nepal’s other political parties and external powers including 
India.  The cabinet order sacking Mr. Katuwal was annulled 
through a presidential decree allowing the COAS to continue 
in his office. The non-Maoist forces saw the Maoist attempt to 
remove the COAS as an attempt to speed up the integration of 
Maoist combatants into the army. 
Nepal’s attempt to integrate the radical forces of a 
decade long Maoist insurgency without having made a 
successful institutional transformation from its authoritarian 
past makes Nepal’s political transition truly unique, and 
therefore not fitting precisely into any of the existing 
modes of transition.  Yet, with the Maoists commitment to 
democratic politics continually under doubt, Nepal’s politics 
has become increasingly polarized between the Maoists and 
those supporting the building of a democratic Nepali state. 
This polarization has both positive and negative impacts. On 
the plus side, it has created greater unity among non-Maoist 
groups; more than 20 parties are supporting the current 
coalition that replaced the Maoists. This has raised underlined 
the need for the Maoists to compromise and play by commonly 
agreed rules. On the negative side, it has undermined the 
ability of democratic forces to govern and to complete the task 
of writing the constitution. Without the cooperation of the 
Maoists, the political process in Nepal will remain stalemated 
and conflictual.  Moreover, the Maoists’ continued reliance on 
protest politics as well as violence, and its continued threat to 
usurp power through street protests has pushed Nepal’s other 
political parties into increasing reliance on the military as an 
insurance against the feared Maoist attempt to overwhelm 
the state. The row over the COAS Katuwal’s sacking clearly 
manifested this phenomenon.  Perhaps the only element that 
could lead Nepal’s current transition process to success is the 
broad unity between Nepal’s internal political forces and the 
backing of external powers to non-Maoist forces to keep the 
Maoists from overwhelming Nepal’s other political forces and 
taking over the state. Whether this will eventually succeed 
in consolidating democracy or renew conflict and civil war 
remains to be seen. 
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